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10 Romania – Polity Contestation and the
Resilience of Mainstream Parties
Endre Borbáth
10.1 Introduction
Among the ﬁfteen countries examined in the current volume, the
Romanian case stands out for two reasons: a dominance of political
issues and a relative instability of the ideological structure. Political
parties in Romania show much ﬂexibility in adjusting their issue posi-
tions from one election to another, which results in a relatively ﬂuid
ideological structure. Although the large swings of the parties’ issue
positions indicate a low level of party-system institutionalisation, par-
ties show considerable resilience. The extent of this stability is surpris-
ing given the generally high volatility in the CEE region (Chapter 11
on Latvia is illustrative of this phenomenon). Nevertheless, the eco-
nomic and the accompanying political crises (see Chapter 1) left their
mark on the stability of the parties and resulted in a high level of extra-
systemic volatility. This chapter examines the dynamics of party com-
petition in the light of the two forms of crisis in a comparison of four
electoral campaigns over time (2004–2016).
As the chapter argues, political issues are instrumental to the survival of
mainstream parties. On issues like reforming democracy or ﬁghting cor-
ruption, parties can switch positions from one election to another without
losing their electorate to their competitors. There are three background
conditions which contribute to the high share of political issues and to the
survival of mainstream parties: (1) the electoral system, (2) the semi-
presidential institutional design, and (3) a clientelistic resource alloca-
tion. First, the relatively restrictive electoral system keeps new parties
outside the system and helps established parties survive. Second, the
semi-presidential constitutional set-up heightens animosities between
the prime minister and the president by splitting government responsi-
bilities between the two ofﬁces. Third, established networks of clientelism
contribute to the survival of themainstream parties independently of their
programmatic appeals.
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Given the severity of the recession in Romania, one might expect the
economic crisis to have had a profound impact on party competition.
Adding in the blurred programmatic appeal of parties and the important
role played by clientelism, it would seem as if all the pre-conditions were
met for popular anger, fuelled by economic problems, to drive out the
mainstream parties. When a political crisis followed the economic crisis
and led to a failed attempt to suspend President Ba˘sescu, one might have
expected the electorate to lose all its trust in the parties. However, the
2016 election brought a landslide victory for the post-communist left in
a regional context where such parties are generally in decline (see
Chapter 8). Even though new parties entered parliament, established
parties kept their dominant positions and muddled through the crises.
The reaction of the party system to the economic and political crises
reveals important mechanisms in the dynamics of party competition.
On one hand, the post-communist left and one of its main adversaries
on the right managed to survive the crises and are still the most popular
parties. On the other hand, new parties entered parliament, and for the
ﬁrst time the mainstream parties were faced with serious challengers.
I suggest that the survival of the mainstream parties is linked to their
ability to shift their positions on political issues, the most salient conﬂict
in the party competition.
I start the chapter in Section 10.2 with a review of the traditional
conﬂicts which characterise politics in Romania. In Section 10.3,
I introduce the institutional framework and the main parties in the party
system. Against these background conditions, I discuss the parties’ reac-
tions to the economic and political crises in Section 10.4. Next, in
Section 10.5, I use the parties’ issue positions as reported in two news-
papers to map and explain party competition during four parliamentary
election campaigns from 2004 to 2016. Section 10.6 concludes with
a general discussion of the nature of the party competition and the effects
of the political and economic crises.
10.2 Cleavages, Census and Issue Divides
Although some patterns of electoral behaviour are fairly consistent over
time, the underlying electoral coalitions in Romania do not correspond to
all three elements in Bartolini and Mair’s (1990: 215) deﬁnition of
cleavages. Conﬂicts either (1) are not rooted in socio-structural differ-
ences, (2) do not distinguish between normative identities, or (3) are not
mobilised by parties. Therefore, I employ Deegan-Krause’s (2013) fra-
mework, which distinguishes between census and issue divides. As this
section explains, the lack of ‘full cleavages’ provides the supply-side
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condition for the parties to be able to shift their programmatic appeals and
to rely on clientelism.
In terms of its consequences for citizens’ lives, the most important
conﬂict in Romanian politics has been an overlapping class and periphery
census divide. The underlying conﬂict is rooted in demographic and
behavioural elements in terms of support for parties, but it does not
involve a consciously articulated group identity (Deegan-Krause 2013:
42), which is why it is called a ‘census’ divide. As surveys show, around
40 percent of the Romanian electorate, primarily the lower socioeco-
nomic groups, are not able to place themselves on a left–right axis
(Marian 2013: 112). The underlying socioeconomic divide is exploited
by parties, but it hardly appears in terms of class identities. As one of the
most neoliberal market economies (Bohle and Greskovits 2012:
182–223), Romania struggles with the highest level of income inequality
within the EU (European Commission 2017: 78), with 40 percent of
citizens living in poverty or social exclusion. A considerable share of these
citizens rely on welfare beneﬁts and services provided by the state (e.g.
healthcare). In contrast, those who are somewhat better off and can be
considered the relative ‘winners’ from the transition expect the state to
improve the quality of services, to ‘clean’ up corruption and to increase
efﬁciency. Parties cater to the marginalised segments of society with
clientelistic transfers without adjusting their programmatic appeal.
A range of studies based on experimental (Mares and Muntean 2015)
and observational (Kitschelt et al. 2012) evidence show a high prevalence
of clientelism in Romania relative to other eastern European countries.
In this regard, party organisation and the local elite play a crucial role.
Accordingly, the participation rate follows a surprising pattern: poorer
regions record higher levels of electoral participation. Clientelistic prac-
tices fostered by the lack of economic group identities allow parties to gain
the support of marginalised voters without pressure to formulate clear
positions on the economy in their programmatic appeals. The most easily
observed implication is a relatively stable electoral map from one election
to another (King and Marian 2011, 2014).
In addition to the conﬂict around ‘economic’ issues, there are three
‘cultural’ issue divides with a consistent albeit less important inﬂuence on
party competition. In the 1990s, as in other eastern European countries,
Romania experienced the emergence of amostly symbolic divide between
communists and anti-communists, which was linked to the lustration
process and to property restitution. The relevance of this divide declined
over time, partly because the communist successor party consolidated its
position and partly because former communist ofﬁcials penetrated all the
major parties (Pop-Eleches 2008). A further divide originates from the
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interplay between ethnic nationalism and religiosity. The contentious
demands of the Hungarian minority, represented by one of the most
successful (ethnic) parties (Kiss, Barna and Székely unpublished),
strengthen nationalism. The divide is reinforced by a religious distinction
between Hungarians (who are mostly Roman Catholic or Calvinist) and
Romanians (who tend to be Orthodox or Greek Catholic). However,
despite the high level of religiosity of Romanians and the ﬁnancial support
of churches, the party structure does not represent a secular–religious
cleavage. In fact, parties rely on the churches to mobilise the electorate.
To the extent to which anti-communism, nationalism and religiosity form
a loosely deﬁned ‘cultural’ dimension, it relates to the pace of modernisa-
tion/Europeanisation. Although these positions are often unclear, mod-
ernisers expect the ‘Westernisation’ of Romania to further what they
consider progressive politics. By contrast, traditionalists identify with
defensive nationalism (see Chapter 1) and aim to protect the ethnic
Romanian way of life from its internal or external enemies. This links
political issues to the cultural dimension. Penescu (2002), for instance,
argues that, apart from the conﬂict between the two ethnicities, nation-
alismmostly concerns the extent to which it is desirable for Romanians to
politically self-organise and not blindly adapt to the requirements of
transnational bodies like the EU.
10.3 The Institutional Framework
The political mobilisation of these divides is shaped by the institutions
Romania adopted during its transition to democracy. Two institutions
have a particularly strong inﬂuence on the issue repertoire of party com-
petition, and they played an important role in shaping the parties’ reac-
tions to the economic and political crises: semi-presidentialism and the
electoral system. As this section describes, both semi-presidentialism and
the electoral system contribute to blurred accountability and allow parties
to shift the blame for policy failures and to adapt issue positions to the
power relations of the moment.
After 1989, Romania adopted a semi-presidential institutional struc-
ture with a directly elected president who has similar but somewhat
weaker prerogatives than his/her French counterpart. After consulting
with the parties in parliament, the president nominates the prime minis-
ter, who shares his/her role as leader of the executive. The prime minister
chairs the government, which formulates and implements public policies.
The prime minister is accountable to parliament and most often comes
from the party with the highest share of the vote. Even though the prime
minister has the greatest power in formulating public policies, the
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president can veto the parliament’s decisions and make it difﬁcult for the
government to implement its programme. In turn, parliament can sus-
pend the president, but this is conditional on approval by a popular
referendum, which in order to be valid requires a turnout of more than
50 percent of the electorate.
The system requires close cooperation between the two ofﬁces.
Cohabitations, i.e. when the president and the prime minister come
from different political parties, considerably sharpen political conﬂict.
In such situations, the partisan conﬂict penetrates the executive branch,
with the government and the president often working to undermine each
other’s position. Although the president is supposed to stand above party
lines, all elected presidents have tried to help their own party gain power.
Therefore, conﬂicts arising from cohabitation tend to escalate beyond
regular political debates and target the institutions themselves. In the
1990s, conﬂicts between President Iliescu and Prime Minister Roman
led to violent protests, although both were members of the same party.
In the period under examination, President Ba˘sescu tried to undermine
parliament, while Prime Ministers Ponta and Ta˘riceanu tried to curtail
the powers of the president.
Given that the Romanian constitution is particularly difﬁcult to revise,
semi-presidentialism can hardly be changed. Since the 1989 regime
change there has only been one constitutional reform (2003). This was
driven by external pressure to comply with some of the requirements of
the NATO and the EU accession processes. During the constitutional
reform, the term of the president was prolonged to ﬁve years to avoid
overlapping parliamentary and presidential elections. While in other
semi-presidential countries cohabitation is often seen as a problem to
avoid, in Romania the lack of cohabitation was perceived as a problem
(Gherghina and Hein 2016, 183). The constitutional reformers
attempted to strengthen the checks and balances by increasing the
chances of non-aligning majorities. Therefore, the last time that the
president and parliament were simultaneously elected was the 2004
election.
In practice semi-presidentialism creates a split executive, with the
prime minister as the ‘biggest loser of the constitutional system’
(Gallagher and Andrievici 2008: 146). Despite the policy-making powers
of the prime minister, the president is often able to take credit for popular
decisions. The president’s ability to dominate the political landscape is
reﬂected by higher levels of turnout in presidential elections compared to
parliamentary ones (see Chapter 16). Even though the constitutional
change was designed to give a direct mandate to the prime minister’s
party, the differential turnout continued, and the president is often seen
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as more legitimate. Nevertheless, the president is not able to design or
implement policies without the prime minister. Therefore, the split
executive and blurred incumbency allows parties to mutually blame
their opponent for policy failures whether they are in government or
delegate the president.
Next to semi-presidentialism, the second component which facilitates
shifting issue positions and helps established parties survive is the elec-
toral system and the law on political parties. During the period examined
here, these laws changed frequently. In the 2004 election the parliament
was elected using a closed-list proportional system with a 5 percent
threshold and forty-one electoral districts (all the counties plus
Bucharest). After an extensive debate, with President Ba˘sescu and civil
society organisations pushing for a majoritarian system and some of the
parties insisting on keeping the system proportional, a 2008 reform
established a compromise. The new system kept the closed party list
and introduced a two-tier redistribution allowing for proportional seat
allocation. It granted a direct mandate to candidates whowon an absolute
majority of the vote in their district. The reform did not lead to partisan
effects but made the election of individual candidates less predictable
(both for voters and parties) and increased the role of individuals as
opposed to parties (Marian and King 2010; Marian 2013: 31–42).
Therefore, the new system contributed to blurring party positions by
making the national campaign less visible relative to the campaigns of
individual candidates. In 2015, the changes introduced in 2008 were
mostly withdrawn, and the 2016 parliamentary election was conducted
according to similar rules to those in place in 2004.
Throughout the history of democratic elections, the electoral system
and the regulations on political parties have been successfully used by
established parties to facilitate cartelisation and create a legal barrier
against outsiders entering parliament (Popescu and Soare 2014).
According to the law on parties, to establish a new party 25,000 signatures
needed to be collected from citizens residing in at least half of the coun-
ties. This provision made it extremely hard to register new parties.
Moreover, the threshold kept them outside of parliament even if they
were registered. Therefore, small parties often became satellite organisa-
tions of more established formations and ran in coalition with them to
ensure their presence in parliament. The law was changed in 2015 and
made it possible to register a new party with three founding members.
Nevertheless, the reform maintained a high barrier for newcomers by
requiring them to collect the signatures of 1 percent of the electorate to
put up candidates (180,000 signatures in 2016). As a result of this reform,
seven new parties contested the 2016 election (Dumitru and Voicu 2016:
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18), one of which entered parliament (USR). Two additional new parties
entered parliament, but they were registered before the 2015 reform.
In comparison to other eastern European countries, these dynamics
have created a party system with relatively stable party labels (Haughton
and Deegan-Krause 2015), which nevertheless frequently form pre-
electoral coalitions.
10.4 The Party System
Table 10.1 presents the election results for the different parties in the
period 2000–2016 along with statistics on the Romanian party system.
As the table shows, the Romanian party system does not follow a linear
development over time. During the period 2000–2012 it seemed as if the
system had stabilised, and Romania was regularly cited as an example of
a system in which new parties had little chance of entering (e.g. Engler
2016: 281). Nevertheless, the 2016 election showed a sharp increase in
extra-system volatility and in fragmentation. In 2016, a previously impor-
tant party disappeared (PDL) and three new parties entered parliament
(ALDE, PMP, USR). Despite these changes, the combined vote share of
mainstream parties did not fall and stayed at the relatively high level of
80.5 percent. Across the four election campaigns, turnout declined and
polarisation remained relatively low.
According to their own characterisations, the mainstream political
parties can be grouped into four families. Most of them have been present
since the founding election in 1990: Social Democratic, National-
Liberal, Christian-Democratic and ethnic Hungarian parties. Even
though these parties have organised themselves into all the possible
government coalitions, I treat the National-Liberal and Christian-
Democratic parties as the mainstream right in opposition to the main-
stream left, the Social Democrats. In addition, I introduce two types of
challenger parties which have never been in government: radical right and
anti-establishment reform parties.
As the asymmetry indicator in Table 10.1 shows, in Romanian politics
the mainstream left is more popular than the mainstream right. The main
party on the left has been the post-communist Social Democratic Party
(PSD). It was even the most popular party in 2008, when the mainstream
right collectively won more votes than the mainstream left. The PSD has
often run in coalition with the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR), later
renamed the Conservative Party (PC), a minor political force which has
never entered parliament independently of the PSD. In 2016, the PC
merged with a liberal faction to form ALDE and entered parliament.
In the 1990s, another inﬂuential party had competed in the Socialist
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Table 10.1 Romanian election results and party-system features
Election 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Election results
(vote shares)
Mainstream left 36.6 36.6 33.1 58.6 49.6
PSD 36.61 36.62 33.1 58.63 44.1
ALDE - - - - 5.5
Mainstream right 22.9 33.2 51.0 16.5 24.7
PNL 6.9 31.34 18.6 - 19.5
PD/PDL 7.0 - 32.4 16.55 -
PMP - - - - 5.2
PNȚCD 5.0 1.9 - - -
ApR 4.0 - - - -
Ethnic Hungarian 6.8 6.2 6.2 5.1 6.2
UDMR 6.8 6.2 6.2 5.1 6.2
Radical right 19.5 15.2 5.5 1.3 3.7
PRM 19.5 13.0 3.2 1.3 1.0
PNG - 2.2 2.3 - -
PRU - - - - 2.7
Anti-establishment - - - 14.0 8.6
reform parties
PPDD - - - 14.0 -
USR - - - - 8.6
Party system
features
Turnout 65.3 58.5 39.2 41.8 39.5
(Chamber of Deputies)
Volatility extra-system 10.2 6.0 5.9 7.0 26.6
Volatility within-system 27.2 12.4 11.6 11.9 4.0
Volatility total 37.4 18.4 17.4 18.9 30.6
Effective no. 5.2 3.9 3.93 1.6 3.7
of parties
Mainstream 69.1 76.0 90.3 80.2 80.5
party vote
Asymmetry6 18.9 5.3 −17.83 42.1 24.9
Polarisation (0 to 1) - 0.12 0.17 0.08 0.19
1 The party ran as PDSR; PSD was established from the merger of PDSR and the minor
party of PSDR.
2 In 2004 and in 2008 PSD ran in coalition with PUR, the party which subsequently turned
into PC.
3 PSD ran in coalition with PNL, PC andUNPR, a small splinter party, as the Social Liberal
Union (USL). I include the results of USL under PSD given PNLwas the junior partner in
the coalition.
4 PNL ran in coalition with PD, the party which subsequently turned into PDL.
5 PDL ran in coalition with two small parties, FC and PNȚCD.
6 Vote share of mainstream left minus vote share of mainstream right.
Sources: Own calculations, ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016).
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camp, the Democratic Party (PD). Following the tradition of the
Romanian Communist party, which combined ethnic nationalism with
communist ideology, these parties represent a leftist position in terms of
‘economic’ issues and a more conservative position in terms of ‘culture’.
In contrast to the dominance of PSD on the mainstream left, the
mainstream right is more fragmented. In 2004, the Democratic Party
(PD) changed its leader to Traian Ba˘sescu, a charismatic politician who
recognised the ideological space in the Christian Democratic camp and
gradually switched the party to the right. The PD took on a new name,
and, under the leadership of Ba˘sescu, renamed as the Democratic Liberal
Party (PDL), it became the main competitor in the Christian Democratic
camp. As old conservative formations disappeared (ApR, PNȚCD), PDL
emerged as the most popular party on the right, with the National Liberal
Party (PNL) as the second-largest formation. PNL is a ‘historical party’
with links to the interwar period and was re-established after 1989.
In 2012, the PNL ran in coalition with PSD, forming an electoral alliance
across the left–right divide. Despite its popularity, the PSD–PNL coali-
tion did not prove stable, and in 2016 PNL merged with PDL, re-
establishing the left–right poles. After a poor PDL electoral performance
in 2012 and the departure of its founder, Ba˘sescu, the merger between
PNL and PDL was regarded as the end of PDL. Traditionally parties on
the right represent somewhat liberal economic positions with an anti-
communist ideology. In terms of their programmatic appeal there is
hardly any consistent difference to distinguish between them.
In 2016 two new parties entered parliament and joined the main-
stream. Although new parties are often contrasted with the mainstream,
both parties were linked to established formations and were founded by
politicians who had previously served as prime minister (Ca˘lin Popescu
Ta˘riceanu – ALDE) or president (Traian Ba˘sescu – PMP). Therefore,
even though they were technically new, they were different from challen-
ger parties due to their links to the existing political elite. The Alliance of
Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), a left-wing liberal party, joined forces
with the remains of PC/PUR and entered parliament with a promise to
help PSD form a government. The People’s Movement Party (PMP) ran
on a platform previously associated with PDL and promised to oppose
PSD ‘at all costs’.
As the table shows, the mainstream parties are popular: even at their
worst they are able to secure 70 percent of the vote. The remaining
30 percent is relatively volatile and has served as a breeding ground for
challenger parties forming a ‘new party subsystem’ (see Chapter 1). Up
until 2008, the main challenger party came from the radical right.
The largest radical right party was the Greater Romania Party (PRM),
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the leader of which entered the second round of the presidential election
in 2000. While the radical right was the main challenger from 1989 to the
2000s, the strength of these parties sharply declined in the period under
study, and in 2008 they failed to enter parliament. As the table shows, the
decline in their popularity was partly due to fragmentation and the emer-
gence of new competitors. First the New Generation Party (PNG) and
then in 2016 a new radical right party, United Romania (PRU), com-
peted and ran a relatively visible campaign but failed to enter parliament.
When in parliament, the radical right has spoken out against the political
class and the Hungarian minority. The Hungarian minority party
(UDMR) has been present in parliament since 1990 and has served as
a coalition partner of governments of parties from both the right and the
left.
The 2012 and the 2016 elections saw the rise of a new type of challen-
ger: anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs), as deﬁned byHanley and
Sikk (2016: 523). These authors note the lack of such parties in the
Romanian context (p. 524), but their analysis does not include the
People’s Party Dan Diaconescu (PPDD) and the Save Romania Union
(USR). Both PPDD and USR mobilised on an anti-establishment plat-
form and built on genuinely new organisations. As opposed to the ‘old’
challengers from the radical right, these parties were less nationalistic.
As the ﬁrst new party to enter parliament on its own since 1989, PPDD
achieved a stunning 14 percent, while USR gained 8.6 percent of the vote.
However, PPDD did not manage to endure the test of time. After its
leader failed to enter parliament, the party was faced with heavy intra-
parliamentary party switching and disappeared during the 2012–2016
legislative term. In contrast, USR beneﬁted from a wave of anti-
corruption protests and has managed to survive until the time of writing.
10.5 Crises and Crisis Dynamics
In the Romanian case, the party competition dynamics during the eco-
nomic and the political crises have partly diverged from the step-wise
pattern of electoral accountability observed in other European countries
(see Chapter 1). While in other European countries in the aftermath of
the economic crisis voters ﬁrst turned to the mainstream opposition and
then to challenger parties, in Romania the vote for mainstream parties did
not decline. As in the Hungarian case, the mainstream opposition PSD
party won the ﬁrst (2012) and the second (2016) post-crisis elections.
Weak institutions and a high share of political issues allowed the main-
stream parties to shift their programmatic appeal and avoid punishment
for the crisis. An important pre-condition in this regard was the role
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played by the incumbent president, Traian Ba˘sescu. This section details
the development of party competition since the 2004 election and the
facilitating role played by institutions, which ultimately led to the survival
of the mainstream parties.
In 2004, Traian Ba˘sescu (PDL) was elected as president. He was
a polarising ﬁgure who did not shy away from using his power to bend
institutions to serve his own political goals. His actions deﬁned the
political conﬂicts in the period of his ten-year presidency (2004–2014),
and his two terms re-shaped the role of presidents in Romanian politics.
Ba˘sescu fostered an image of being the president of the people ﬁghting
against a corrupt elite. The ﬁght against corruption had long been seen as
amajor issue in Romanian party politics, but before Ba˘sescu it wasmostly
an issue of the radical right. He was the ﬁrst candidate from amainstream
party to compete with a programme of ﬁghting corruption. This led to his
successful election and re-election (2004, 2009) on the most populist
platform in Romanian politics at the time (Hawkins 2013).
Apart from his advocacy for the ﬁght against corruption, Ba˘sescu used
his power to nominate the prime minister to inﬂuence government for-
mation. He used this prerogative on two occasions to split parties and
form a new parliamentary majority made up of parties from the main-
stream right. The ﬁrst time this occurred was in the aftermath of the 2004
presidential and parliamentary elections, when instead of choosing the
candidate supported by PSD-PUR, Ba˘sescu nominated his political ally
Ta˘riceanu (PNL). The second time was in the midst of the shock period
of the ﬁnancial crisis before the 2009 presidential election, when he
refused to nominate Klaus Iohannis, then the PSD-PNL candidate.
Instead, and this proved to be a consequential step for the long-term
development of party competition, he helped Emil Boc (PDL) form
a slim parliamentary majority with UDMR and collaborated with Boc
to implement austerity measures in response to the shock of the ﬁnancial
crisis. On both occasions, he was successful in forging a new alliance due
to intra-parliamentary party switching and party splits. Before his term,
the president’s role in nominating the prime minister had been seen as
a formality, and no other president had used his power to change the
majority in parliament.
Political parties (apart from PDL) regularly accused Ba˘sescu of abus-
ing his mandate and perceived his actions as direct threats to their deci-
sion-making autonomy. To ﬁght the challenge of Ba˘sescu, they twice
initiated the procedure to suspend the president from ofﬁce. Both times
parliament voted for his dismissal, but, as mentioned, suspension from
ofﬁce is conditional on a mandatory popular referendum, which in both
2007 and 2012 allowed Ba˘sescu to stay on. The second suspension came
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close to succeeding with the support of an overwhelming majority of
voters, but ultimately it failed due to the 50 percent turnout provision.
By the time of the second suspension attempt, Ba˘sescu’s popularity had
declined markedly, not the least due to his role in the management of the
economic crisis.1 This crisis ﬁrst entered party competition in June 2009,
when the PSD-PDL government turned to the IMF for a 20 billion euro
credit but postponed austerity measures until after the 2009 presidential
election. To compete in the presidential election, PSD left the govern-
ment, and all the austerity policies had to be implemented by a narrow
centre-right PDL–UDMR coalition. These measures were announced by
the re-elected President Ba˘sescu and included a 25 percent cut in the
salaries of public ofﬁcials, a cut of thousands of state jobs and an increase
in VAT from 19 percent to 24 percent. Most of the austerity policies were
justiﬁed by IMF demands and were implemented in close cooperation
between President Ba˘sescu and the PDL-UDMR government.
Following these measures, the unpopular centre-right Boc government
survived seven motions of no conﬁdence and continued in ofﬁce until the
beginning of 2012. In the 2012 election PDL lostmost of its voters, and in
2014 what remained of it merged with PNL, making it one of the few
former government parties to completely disappear.
The 2012 PSD–PNL grand coalition played an instrumental role in the
collapse of PDL.Even though parties from the left and the right often formed
coalition governments, PSD and PNL were the ﬁrst to form a pre-electoral
coalition across the left-right divide. The dramatic loss of PDL’s popularity
and Ba˘sescu’s involvement in keeping Boc and PDL in power forged this
unusual alliance. Even though Ba˘sescu’s election in 2004 was supported by
PNL, in 2007hemade a successful attempt to break upPNLand formPDL.
PNL survived, but the traditionally anti-communist party ended up in a joint
platformwithPSD,Ba˘sescu’smainadversary.The twopartieswere reluctant
to form a coalition, but between 2007 and 2008PSD supported theminority
PNL-UDMR government. In 2012 they formed the PSD–PNL coalition
government, which as its ﬁrst act initiated the suspension of Ba˘sescu.
Before the suspension, fearing a low turnout the PSD-PNL
amended the regulation to remove the turnout threshold for a valid
referendum. Although this amendment was struck down by the con-
stitutional court, it intensiﬁed President Ba˘sescu’s attacks on PSD-
PNL, accusing them of dismantling existing democratic institutions in
a ‘coup d’etat’ against the ‘rule of law’. As a reaction to the attempt by
1 In Romania the euro crisis slowed growth, but its economic and political effects were
minor relative to the shock period of the ﬁnancial crisis. Therefore, throughout this
chapter ‘economic crisis’ refers to the shock period.
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PSD-PNL to change the threshold, European leaders expressed con-
cerns over the rule of law in Romania, but these concerns were
criticised as partisan pro-Ba˘sescu interventions. Fearing defeat,
Ba˘sescu called on his supporters to not turn out, and the referendum
failed by being declared invalid. Nevertheless, PSD-PNL went on to
campaign against an “illegitimate” president in the 2012 parliamen-
tary election. Given the way institutions fell prey to party interests,
many considered the 2012 procedure to suspend the president
a political crisis.
In 2014 a new president, Klaus Iohannis (PNL), was elected on
a platform of resetting and ‘normalising’ Romanian politics. Similarly to
Ba˘sescu, Iohannis ran with an anti-corruption message, which by this time
had become the most salient issue. Even though it was less controversial,
Iohannis followed Ba˘sescu’s legacy and used his power to nominate the
prime minister to block Sevil Shhaideh, the PSD candidate after the 2016
election. Somewhat paradoxically, his term coincided with both
a strengthening of PSD and the rise of a new type of challenger AERP.
To explain the former, Ban (2016) partly attributes PSD’s 2016 victory to
the party’s opposition to PDL’s austerity measures. In this perspective, the
austerity measures implemented by the centre-right PDL-UDMR govern-
ment contributed to an ideological crystallisation of parties, in line with the
alignment dynamic described in Chapter 1. In this view, the economic and
political crises had not yet ceased to shape Romanian party competition.
10.6 Structure, Content and Stability in Party Competition
The four electoral campaigns studied cover the period before the Great
Recession (2004), the start of the economic crisis (2008), the time of the
political crisis (2012) and the aftermath of the crisis (2016). I start by
presenting the development of issue salience and politicisation. Then,
I explore the ways in which the mainstream parties took positions on the
issues. Finally, I conclude by examining the political space in the four
elections under consideration.
Issue Salience and Politicisation
Figure 10.1 presents the development of the salience and politicisation of
issues related to the economy, culture, political competition/institutions
and the ﬁght against corruption.2 Overall, as the ﬁgure shows, issues
2 There is hardly any competition on issues related to security and defence. Therefore,
I only include ‘new’ cultural issues.
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related to the economy and the ﬁght against corruption were the most
salient in Romanian party competition. For instance, in 2008 over 50 per-
cent of the campaign revolved around economic issues, while in 2016
a similar share revolved around the ﬁght against corruption. Issues related
to political competition and institutions were almost as salient as the
previous two categories, and they were the most salient in 2012. Unlike
the regional pattern, issues related to the cultural dimension are less
salient in Romanian politics: the salience of issues like nationalism and
anti-communism stayed at around 10 percent across all four elections.
However, when we account for the different levels of polarisation and
calculate the overall score for the politicisation of conﬂicts over these issue
categories, their importance changes. Conﬂicts over economic issues and
the ﬁght against corruption were the most politicised, while the level of
politicisation of political/institutional and cultural issues lies lower.
The level of politicisation of all four issue categories varies over time.
In the pre-crisis period (2004), we observe a low level of politicisation
across all the categories. At the beginning of the economic crisis (2008)












2004 2008 2012 2016 2004 2008 2012 2016
salience salience x polarisation
economic political
cultural fighting corruption
Figure 10.1 Salience and politicisation by issue domain in Romania
Note: The salience and polarisationmeasures are based on aggregates of
the respective sub-categories shown in Table 3.2. For Romania, we
coded the following two newspapers:Adeva˘rul and Jurnalul Național (for
details, see Chapter 3).
Romania – Polity Contestation 227
issues also becamemore politicised. During the political crisis (2012), the
politicisation of economic and cultural issues declined while that of
political issues increased. In the ﬁrst post-crisis election (2016), all
types of issue were more politicised, and the ﬁght against corruption
became the most politicised.
Although this analysis suggests a party system dominated by economic
issues, there are three important caveats to consider. First, if one is to
combine political/institutional issues with ﬁghting corruption (as in the
other chapters in this volume), the salience of these categories is higher
than that of economic issues. This suggests that party competition in
Romania was mostly related to ‘polity contestation’ and the ﬁght against
corruption.However, these issues are less polarising, partly because of the
valence character of ﬁghting corruption: everybody promises to do
so. Second, competition on economic issues was to a considerable extent
driven by promises to increase wages, either for everyone or for workers in
a speciﬁc sector (e.g. in education). Opposition parties tried to outbid the
government and promise higher spending if elected. Whereas electoral
outbidding often served as a substitute for a strong welfare net and drove
electoral participation, it did not produce the ideological debate one
might expect on issues related to regulation of the economy. Third,
cultural issues like nationalism were not salient but polarising and there-
fore politicised. Thus, next to the economic and the political, a more
latent cultural dimension appears in Romanian politics.
The plots in Figure 10.1 clearly show the effects of the crises. At the
beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 party competition became
dominated by economic issues. If one takes a closer look, many of the
economic issues were related to the positive economic record of the ﬁrst
Ta˘riceanu government and to demands for wages in certain sectors (e.g.
education). By contrast, issues related to austerity or management of the
economic crisis were not discussed. It was only in 2012 that management
of the economic crisis appearedmore forcefully on the agenda, with PSD-
PNL accusing the outgoing PDL government of presiding over an eco-
nomic/social disaster. Nevertheless, the 2012 campaign – as one would
expect in the midst of a political crisis –was dominated by political issues.
The reason why political issues were not more politicised is related to
their low level of polarisation. Both PSD-PNL and PDL claimed they
would save democracy from its enemies and promised to renew state
institutions to serve the citizens and not a corrupt elite. In the post-
crisis election in 2016 the issue of ﬁghting corruption was the most
salient, and for the ﬁrst time it became more polarised, partly due to the
emergence of AERPs. Cultural issues also appeared more clearly in 2016
among themost politicised ones. Overall, a comparisonwith the pre-crisis
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period (2004) shows that party competition became more politicised
during the crisis.
Party Positions
As the previous paragraphs might have suggested, most of the issues in
Romanian politics do not produce a high level of polarisation. Figure 10.2
presents the positions of the three largest parties (PD/PDL, PNL, PSD)
and one of the new challenger parties (USR)3 on issues related to the
economy, politics, culture and ﬁghting corruption during the four elec-
tion campaigns.4
As the ﬁgure shows, parties are characterised by relatively large
swings in their issue positions depending on the conﬂicts of the day.
In terms of those taken by the mainstream parties, the PSD is com-
monly seen as the anchor of party competition (Florescu 2016).
However, it changed its issue positions substantially during the period
we examine. In 2004, the party combined a pro-welfare stance with
cultural conservatism and was generally reluctant to ﬁght corruption or
invest in reforming the democratic institutions. This changed during
the crisis. The party moderated its pro-welfare stance as it entered the
2012 coalition with PNL, and by 2016 it had switched to an economic-
ally liberal position. In cultural terms, PSD generally assumed
a conservative position, except in 2008 when it tried to distance itself
from being seen as the party of the former regime. However, its largest
swings occurred with respect to issues related to democratic renewal.
In 2008 PSD became the ﬁercest advocate of democratic renewal,
driven by its opposition to what it considered to be the authoritarian
tendencies of President Ba˘sescu. The party moderated its stance on
this issue in 2012, and, although it tried to attack President Iohannis
with pro-democratic rhetoric in 2016, by that time it was seen as the
party most reluctant to invest in renewing democracy.
The parties of the mainstream right, PD/PDL and PNL, tended to
oppose positions associated with the PSD, except during the 2012
PSD–PNL coalition. Thus, from 2004 to 2012 PD/PDL assumed an
economically liberal position, reluctantly embraced cultural liberalism
and tried to distinguish itself by ﬁghting corruption. The parties most
obviously changed their position with respect to democratic renewal.
In 2004, the PDL–PNL coalition called for democratic renewal, but in
3 Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to map the positions of PRM or
PPDD. In the case of the latter this is due to the party’s almost exclusive reliance on its
founder’s TV channel to communicate with its voters.
4 To calculate these positions I exclude issue positions related to electoral outbidding.
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2008 PDL was mostly associated with maintaining the status quo and
avoiding any reforms. During the 2008 and the 2012 campaign, PDL
had to defend President Ba˘sescu against the PSD and PNL accusa-
tions that he was undermining democracy. Initially, PDL could count
on some support from PNL for its economic stance and partly for its
political stance, but this changed in 2012. As PNL entered the coali-
tion with PSD, it assumed a pro-welfare economic position, radicalised
in terms of cultural conservatism and joined the PSD’s call to renew
democracy. In the 2016 campaign, following the fusion of PNL/PDL
the new PNL tried to take a pro-welfare position against the by-now
economically liberal PSD, remained culturally conservative but more
liberal than the PSD and attacked the latter by promising to renew
democracy.
Figure 10.2 also illustrates the relevance of political issues and
ﬁghting corruption in the AERPs’ challenge to the established for-
mations. USR broke into the party system by mobilising on ﬁghting
corruption and reforming democracy. The party combined ﬁghting
corruption with a call for democratic renewal and culturally progres-
sive positions.



















PSD PD/PDL PNL USR
Figure 10.2 Positions of the Romanian parties by issue domain
Note: The positional measures exclude the two ‘vague’ categories
referring to the need for economic and political reforms in general (see
Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 on methods).
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The Political Space in Romania
Figure 10.3 presents the most popular parties’ positions in the program-
matic space during the four electoral campaigns to show how conﬂicts on
the economic, cultural and political dimensions played out in party
competition.
The ﬁgure shows an ever-changing ideological space from one election
to the next. While the issue repertoire stayed relatively constant, with
issues related to the economy (economic liberalism/welfare), politics
(democratic renewal/reform, ﬁghting corruption) and culture (anti-
communism, nationalism) re-emerging in each of these campaigns, the
dimensions of the political space and the party positions ﬂuctuated.
In terms of the dimensionality of the political spaces, we can distinguish
between the two pre-crisis elections (including 2008) when cultural
issues – nationalism in particular – did not yet structure the competition
between the mainstream parties and the post-crisis elections when it did.
In 2004 we observe the lowest level of dimensionality. Economic issues
play a central role in this election, but all three mainstream parties were
very close to welfare with similar positions. As Figure 10.2 already indi-
cated, this clearly changed by 2008, when PD/PDL took a more neolib-
eral economic position. In both elections, the second dimension opposed
the mainstream parties to the radical right PRM. Instead of cultural
issues, PRM campaigned with promises to ﬁght corruption and in 2008
with an anti-communist discourse. While in 2004 PNL and PD/PDL ran
on similar platforms of reforming democracy against the incumbent PSD,
in 2008 PDL attacked the incumbent PNL on the issue of increasing
salaries for teachers and university professors. In 2008 democratic reform
gained an anti-Ba˘sescu dimension, and, as we have already seen, the PSD
was now the most supportive of the issue.
In 2012 and in 2016, nationalism came to play a central role in party
competition. During the political crisis in 2012 the campaign was fought
in a unidimensional space as a clash between two camps: PSD-PNL and
PDL. The single dimension aligned economic and political/cultural con-
tentions in terms of welfare versus neoliberalism and nationalism versus
pro-EU stances. In the context of the 2012 election pro-EU meant PDL
accusing PSD-PNL of Euroscepticism, while PSD-PNL accused EU
leaders of intervening in domestic affairs to save their ally, Ba˘sescu.
At the time, PSD-PNL was running a nationalist campaign with slogans
like ‘We are proud to be Romanians’ to mobilise supporters. Even though
much less clearly than in previous campaigns, PSD-PNL took a pro-
welfare stance at least with regards to PDL’s austerity policies and pro-
mised to renew/reform democracy.
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The 2016 election unfolded in a similar atmosphere except that eco-
nomic issues played a much less important role compared to 2012.
The two polar issues on the economic dimension were very close together
and had little to no impact in structuring the political space. To some
extent PNL assumed pro-welfare positions to distinguish itself fromPSD.
The second dimension opposed nationalism to anti-corruption. PSD,
PMP and the radical-right PRU relied on a nationalist rhetoric against















































Figure 10.3 The structure of the Romanian political space
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background in USR. USR attacked the nationalism of PSD, PMP and
PRU with a discourse on ﬁghting corruption and renewing democracy.
While PNL promised to reform democracy, the USR proposed a more
concrete plan of institutional reforms. As opposed to 2004–2008, in 2016
USR took over the radical right’s issue of ﬁghting corruption.
As Figure 10.3 shows, ALDE acted as a satellite organisation of PSD,
similarly to PUR/PC in previous campaigns.
In all the elections, the second dimension related to political or cultural
issues polarised political parties more than the economic dimension.
Nevertheless, party positions ﬂuctuated to a much greater extent on the
political dimension than on the economic one. Party positions on political
issues seem to have followed power relations in politics more closely than
those on other dimensions. The party in government and the party of the
sitting president defended the status quo, while opposition parties cam-
paigned on reforming/renewing democracy. The crisis led to a rise in the
relative importance of cultural issues in structuring the political space.
As opposed to 2004–2008, in 2012–2016 cultural issues not only discri-
minated between mainstream and challenger parties but structured the
competition between the mainstream parties as well.
10.7 Conclusions
Party competition in Romania as revealed by this analysis is charac-
terised by a rather ﬂuid political space, which allows shifting issue
positions from one election to the other. Positions on political issues
seem to closely follow parties’ incumbency status and change according
to shifts in political majorities. Nevertheless, like other countries in
CEE, we have observed a cultural dimension on which parties take
relatively clear positions (Chapter 1). However, cultural issues are the
least salient, and campaigns are primarily fought on political issues and
on ﬁghting corruption. Given that parties change their positions the
most often on these types of issue, the extent to which voters can
distinguish between competing party formations on programmatic
grounds is doubtful.
Nevertheless, Romanian parties are generally considered remarkably
stable and able to survive over time. From this perspective, the eco-
nomic and political crises were challenging for parties. However, as the
election results show, with the notable exception of PDL the main-
stream parties managed to survive. A key component of their resilience
was their ability to avoid electoral accountability by shifting their issue
positions. In this regard, the crisis did not break the existing pattern of
party competition, and – in line with the main expectation of the
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current volume on CEE dynamics – it contributed to a certain level of
consolidation.
While the primary issues which allowed the mainstream parties to
change their appeal were on the political dimension, the crisis led to
the appearance of cultural issues, primarily nationalism. In the post-
crisis election, it was not only the radical right which campaigned on
nationalist ideas but mainstream parties – PSD in particular – too.
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the strength of the radical right
parties is in decline: the mainstream parties are taking up their primary
issue. It has yet to be seen whether this dynamic will lead to a more
salient cultural dimension or whether political issues will continue to
dominate party competition.
The new parties which emerged during the crises do not provide
a substantially different alternative. As the example of PPDD and USR
shows, political issues played a crucial role in the emergence of these
parties. Unlike new parties in southern Europe which emerged during
the crisis, the new parties in Romania do not formulate
a programmatic appeal to reform the economy or substantially change
certain policies. As AERPs, their main programmatic appeal is formed
around their issue positions on the political dimension and on the ﬁght
against corruption. However, these are the same issues which allow
mainstream parties to exploit a ﬂuid ideological structure and shift
their issue positions.
The institutional set-up facilitates this dynamic. The semi-
presidential structure imposes a conﬂict between the president and
the prime minister on the issue repertoire of parliamentary elections.
Despite changing the electoral calendar and eliminating overlaps
between presidential and parliamentary elections, the two are clearly
connected. In contrast to scholars who argue for a semi-presidential
institutional design (Sartori 1994: 135–137), the Romanian case
clearly shows that such a system damages the parties’ role of providing
clear electoral alternatives. By blurring responsibility and splitting
incumbency between different parties, semi-presidentialism facilitates
a dynamic where parliamentary campaigns are centred on parties
competing over animosities and proposals for institutional reforms
instead of policy alternatives. Moreover, the incentives for mainstream
parties to invest in their programmatic appeals are rather low as long
as they are able to capitalise on the lack of economic group identities
with clientelistic resource allocation and on the electoral system which
keeps newcomers away.
This analysis underlines problems of electoral accountability in
Romania. Despite a long list of pressing problems involving economic
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and social inequality, a high level of corruption and unstable institutions,
voters do not have clear programmatic choices between the competing
party formations. As the dynamic of competition during the economic
and the political crises shows, parties tend to focus on issues detached
from voters’ concerns. Nevertheless, the facts that voters punished PDL
and that two genuinely new parties (PPDD, USR) entered parliament
show signs of party-system change.
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